Independent, Manchester-rooted, evidence-led reporting and explainers.
Brexit isn’t a one-off bill. It’s a persistent drag: the economy is smaller than the no‑Brexit baseline, every year, and the gap compounds.
This isn’t money we might lose. This is money we already lost - and we’re not even trying to scrape it back.
Illustrative Brexit cost paths
Different channels that leave the UK economy smaller than a no‑Brexit baseline — and how the gap builds up over time.
Take the Treasury shortfall, and translate it into estimated budgets through likely tax receipts.
The big important Brexit number was never what “we pay the EU”, it's what that growth did for us. Using a Treasury receipts shortfall of ~£75Bn/yr (±£12.5Bn; sensible range: £65–£90Bn), here’s what that looks like per week - and what share that implies for the NHS if spending stayed roughly proportional.
Other big yearly lines (for scale)
Tax-to-GDP ratio
Used to turn Treasury receipts shortfall into an implied GDP shortfall series for the chart and the total counter.
Assumption: 35%.
NHS share of spending
Default is 19%, the share of total spending that goes to the NHS.
Assumption: 19%.
“Money cycles” factor
Optional storytelling knob for the prize board (1.00 = direct receipts only).
Assumption: 1.40×.
The “tab” isn’t a pile of banknotes in Brussels. It shows up as deadweight loss, lower investment, and friction that turns normal economic activity into overhead. Some of the leak is obvious; some of it is political opportunity.
Key sources
Thanks for reading
It’s easy to feel like it’s too late, or that the argument is stuck forever. It doesn’t have to be.
Almost nobody in politics is shouting “rejoin” (except Steve), but we can still have a serious, practical conversation about healing those economic links, rebuilding trust, and moving toward closer ways of working that other EU‑friendly countries already use.